mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:
Political scientist Victor D. Cha put Lopez's assertion into a far broader context; the failure of international relations research to recognise the importance of sports in the relations between nation states and the way people interact on the international stage. -The study of international relations purports to explain how nation-states and individuals interact around the globe. Yet one major area of such interaction -international sport -remains exceedingly understudied. This in spite of the fact that countries have gone to war over sport, fought for sovereign recognition through sport, and that citizens around the world have it as a daily part of their lives. Indeed it is astounding that a phenomenon that matters so much has been so little studied by a field that purports to explain relations between states and humans around the world… If the operative question is: How does sport ‗fit' into our understanding of world politics? The bottom line is that the existing literature offers no clear or consistent answers,‖ Cha wrote in an effort to develop a theory of sports and politics. 4 This study is a baby step effort to start filling the gap. It builds on the work of scholars who positioned soccer as a pillar of popular culture that makes it a focal point of politics 5 , a social construct shaped by those involved in the game 6 , and a reflection of how a society models existential, political and moral issues.
7

Maintaining a fiction
Sport and politics have intersected globally throughout history. Yet, politicians and sport officials insist on maintaining the fiction that the two are separate despite the fact that nations employ sport to project themselves, while fans display deep-seated passion and play sometimes an independent political role and sometimes a partisan one in association with political factions. Sport expresses national identity as well as that of different groups in society. It reflects how a nation, people or group sees itself and how it wants to be seen. Success in sport validates a group's place in society, a nation's place in the world and a country's ability to wield soft power in an era of globalisation. (New York: Basic Books, 1991) , involving the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, use force or give money as a means of persuasion.
population. Sport-driven change in the Gulf state would follow in the footsteps of (the 1988 Olympics that helped fuel) South Korea's transition from an autocracy to a democracy after the 1988 Olympics, and environmental change in China as a result of the 2008 games.
By the same token, sport as a venue for protest and a domestic policy tool populates human history.
Already in 5
th century Rome, support groups identified as the Blues, Greens, Reds and Whites, in the absence of alternative channels for public expression, acclaimed a candidate slated to be installed as Rome's emperor in games dominated by chariot racing. 9 Much like modern day militant soccer fans or ultras, they frequently shouted political demands in between races in a bid to influence policy. By allowing them to do so, Roman emperors recognised the sports arena as a platform for the public venting of pent-up frustration and anger as well as a listening post that allowed them to take early note of public sentiment and grievances.
In doing so, they set a trend that has since proven its value. In today's modern world, soccer pitches are frequently viewed as barometers of the public mood and indicators of political and social trends.
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency routinely attends Middle Eastern and North African matches to glean clues as to where a country is headed.
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Rome serves further as an early example of the impact of fan power. That was most evident in the 532 AD Nika revolt, the most violent in Constantinople's history, when the then dominant Blues and
Greens rioted for a week, destroyed much of the city, sacked the Hagia Sophia and almost succeeded in forcing Byzantine emperor Justinian I to vacate his throne.
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The identification through patronage and micromanagement of modern day Arab autocrats with soccer emulates the Romans' use of games and sports to solidify their power. Arab autocrats, however unlike their Roman predecessors, were determined to prevent soccer clubs from becoming arbiters of political power. The fans' claim positioned soccer as both a threat and an opportunity for Middle Eastern and North African autocrats. The threat was an increasingly fearless, well-organised, highly politicised and street battle-hardened force that attracted thousands of young men who were willing and able to stand their ground against the security forces. In doing so, they were publicly challenging the state's authority. sustained claim directed at the authorities, a repertoire of performances, and public representation of their cause -but operate separately. That was certainly true for rival groups of ultras who largely were as hostile to one another as they were towards security forces as the repressive face of the state.
They defied however notions of classical social movements like those formulated by Cyrus Zirakzadeh given that that they lacked a clear idea of the alternative order they were seeking to achieve or the basic means to build it. New Yorker journalist and author Malcolm Gladwell came to a similar conclusion almost half a century later in his study of the advantages of weakness and disability and his criticism of Rebellion and Authority by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr, a 1970 declassified Rand publication that became a bible for militaries fighting overseas to suppress revolts and insurgencies. 37 Gladwell argued that perceptions of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the stronger party was the decisive factor that determined the outcome of an asymmetric conflict.
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Stronger parties win when they are able to persuade their weaker opponent that they have legitimacy, they lose if their opponent is able to maintain that they lack legitimacy. The more a stronger party seeks to crush its opponent, the more it loses legitimacy and strengthens the weaker party's resolve and determination to resist. In doing so, the stronger side enhances the likelihood that the weaker party will win. By contrast, a stronger party that seeks to redress the grievances of its weaker opponent gains legitimacy, allowing it to undermine the legitimacy of its distractor and improving its chances of victory. Gladwell's argument and the conclusions of the Oregon Trail are applicable to determined civic groups resisting brutal security forces. In the case of Egypt, militant, well-organised, street battle-hardened soccer fans emerged victorious from four years of confrontations with security forces representing a regime that failed to meet any of the criteria that create legitimacy by virtue of the fact that their organisation survived intact to play a decisive role in the toppling of Mubarak. Survival intact in the face of violent confrontation constituted victory in and of itself. It also displayed the vulnerability and fallibility of a regime that even when it was forced to resort to violence failed to achieve its goal of undisputed control of a key public space, the stadium.
In doing so, the fans with their emphasis on the fight against corruption and nepotism appeared to validate the assertion by anthropologist and geographer David Harvey that the struggle for improved and more egalitarian economic rights is fought as much in the work place as it is urban public spaces like stadia. 45 The fans embodied attributes Gladwell postulates as prerequisites for the success of Harvey, Jadaliyya, 15 November 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15156/on-why-struggles-overurban-space-matter_an-interv their weaknesses; they must be willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause; and they must have discipline and self-control.
A dialectic relationship
The fans' confrontation fit the template scholars Eduardo P. Archetti and Amilcar G. Romero applied to
Argentina two decades earlier. The police and security forces' -use of physical force aided by arms of some kind….(was) exclusively destined to harm, wound, injure, or, in some cases, kill other persons, and not as an act intended to stop unlawful behaviour that is taking place or may take place.,‖ they wrote. Official foot-dragging in holding security officers accountable added to that perception, giving -police power…the aura of omnipotence‖ that -at the same time lost all legitimacy both in moral and manifestations with fireworks, flares, smoke guns and banners; graffiti; poetry; lyrics; and forms of chanting brought fans into confrontation with security forces that fuelled grievances of abuse and mistreatment. Those grievances resonated with their experience of security force mishandling and oppression in their daily lives in the popular neighbourhoods of major cities. Expressing a sentiment widely shared among Egyptians, the ultras taunted the police and security forces during soccer matches and on Tahrir Square with chants asserting that -we will no longer conduct ourselves in line with your whim; spare us your sight" 49 and celebrating their success during the mass protests that toppled Mubarak in giving the security forces and unprecedented thrashing:
"We haven't forgotten Tahrir, you sons of bitches!
The revolution was your catastrophe.
We'll tell anyone… Officers, pimps
You took a beating like you haven't had in years" Bayat defined as a -post national and post ideological movement,‖ 67 successfully targeted students, teachers, judges, lawyers and journalist irrespective of their ideology, religion, gender or social status rather than the traditional opposition forces.
Militant soccer fans fit Bayat's category of urban subjects such as the unemployed, housewives and ‗informal people,' whose only option to express discontent is to resort to a public space such as the street or the stadium because they -lack the institutional power of disruption‖ such as workers' ability to go on strike. -Here conflict originates from the active use of public space by subjects who, in the modern states, are allowed to use it only passively -through, walking driving, watching -or in other ways that the state dictates. Any active or participative use infuriates officials, who see themselves as the sole authority to establish and control public order,‖ 68 Bayat argued. The ultras' claim to ownership of the stadium directly challenged the state's self-defined prerogative and officials' perception of their authority to which the regime instinctively responded with repression.
Similarly, the ultras conformed to Bayat's notion of youth non-movements that are about reclaiming youthfulness and the assertion of their -individuality, creativity, and lightness and free them from anxiety over the prospect of their future. Curbing and controlling youthfulness is likely to trigger youth dissent… The intensity of youth activism depends, first, on the degree of social control imposed on them by moral and political authorities and, second, on the degree of social cohesion among the young.‖ 69 In the absence of structured networks, soccer constituted an important framework in which youth could spontaneously forge a collective identity. -Theirs was not a politics of protest, but of practice, a politics of redress through direct action,‖ Bayat argued referring to informal networks that were stemmed from recognition of commonalities rather than deliberate solidarity whose preoccupation are narrow claims of youthfulness, not big picture political concepts.
Bayat's notion of social non-movements and Aarts and Cavatorta's assertion that civil society is defined by groups seeking to carve out public space that may not be formally organised and do not define themselves as explicitly political is rooted in what Melani Cammett and Ishac Diwan defined as the political economy of this decade's Arab revolts that undermined the social contract that had kept autocrats in power. That political economy links economic factors such as the region's shift towards market rather than planned economies marked by crony capitalism; corruption fuelled by the emergence of regime-bound new elites and low public sector wages; widening inequality and the state's declining ability to cater to the social and welfare needs of a majority of the population; social change involving segments of the population articulating political aspirations and the addressing of grievances; and a political watershed with segments of the middle class -small merchants and industrialists that frequently populated the informal sector who benefited from the transition to a market economy and private sector skilled labour -no longer willing to align themselves with the regime.
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Cammett and Diwan argue that their political economic framework explains why the revolts were sparked by secularist youth, a category to which the bulk of militant soccer fans belong in Tunisia and Egypt -two countries that had relatively high growth rates at the time. 71 They noted that on a regional This trend was reinforced by U.S. and European policies that sought to ensure regional stability by maintaining the status quo rather than risky political and social change.
The social contract ruptures
A Pew Research survey published two months after the fall of Mubarak concluded that corruption and lack of democracy topped Egyptians' concerns ahead of economic prosperity and political stability.
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In a separate paper two years later, Diwan argued that analysis of opinion by social class in the years between 2000 and 2008 showed that both the lower and the middle class increasingly clamoured for more democracy as a result of complaints among the poor about increasing inequality and the middle classes' sense of unfulfilled aspirations. 74 These dashed expectations were the product of some middle class segments joining the ranks of the poor as well as economic liberalisation policies producing small merchants and industrialists who, unlike civil servants employees of state-owned companies who accounted for the bulk of the middle class, were less dependent on the government and therefore less politically restrained. The ultras' willingness to assert their claim to ownership of the stadium was fuelled by the impact of the rupture in the social contract involving social and welfare cutbacks at the same time that increasingly close ties between the regime and its economic cronies became evident in heightened control of clubs by these elites and widespread corruption in the sport. Fan opposition to the effects of crony capitalism on a key tenant of their lives reflected broader popular concerns that cut across age groups. With other words, while youth, including soccer fans, emerged as the main actor in popular revolts, their concerns were shared by their parents and older members of their extended families.
The ultras' claim to ownership was rooted in a fierce, tribal-like loyalty to the club expressed in an architectural environment that allows for strength in numbers and encourages solidarity and collective action compounded by a game that aims to conquer territory. It enabled the ultras to stand up to authorities' attempts to halt them in their tracks. These attempts often followed a classic pattern as The identity reasserted by mostly male soccer fans in stadia is tribal given that their allegiance to the club was more often than not instilled in them by their fathers. It is reinforced moreover by the large numbers in a confined environment and the nature of the sport, which involves the conquest of territory. It constitutes a modern day validation of the notion of Abd-ar-Rahman Aby Zayd ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, the 14 th century father of sociology, of tribal solidarity as a driver of change.
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The feeding ground for protest and confrontation with security forces was beyond the ultras' ideological claim of ownership enhanced by the fact that the state's options were limited. Soccer was too popular a form of popular culture for it to simply close all stadia or permanently ban the public from attending matches. Its only option was to make repressive law enforcement, involving intrusive security checks and violence, a fact of life. The nature of the stadium and the ultras' artistic yet aggressive expressions of support for their club shaped the confrontation with the state, which in turn strengthened bonds among the fans. State reprisals instilled a deep-seated aversion to what they termed abuse and mistreatment among ultras, politicised them to varying degrees.
The soccer fans claim to ownership of the stadia enabled them to defy notions that a lack of vibrant, dynamic and interactive urban public spaces prevents collective action put forward by sociologist Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin, 82 anthropologist Setha Low and geographer Neil Smith, 83 geographer Don by the fact that law enforcement refrained from entering the walled campuses of Beijing universities to prevent further alienation of already restless students. Initially, the Chinese approach was part of a soft strategy that also involved public denunciation of the protesters. It was a strategy that backfired. It encouraged rather than dissuaded the student activists. In the end, the Chinese reverted to the way law enforcement in the Middle East and North Africa handled protest: the obstruction and prevention of protest by militant soccer fans by ensuring that police and security forces had an overwhelming presence in and around stadiums. 
Conclusion
The identification of non-traditional social groups that drive political change reinforces Tilley's suggestion that comparisons of social movements needs to take their specific historical contexts into account 92 or in other words recognise that straightforward comparisons can be misleading. African exceptionalism that prevented analysts and scholars from recognizing winds of change in the region.
-Many academics focused on explaining what they saw as the most interesting and anomalous aspect of Arab politics: the persistence of undemocratic rulers… These regimes survived over a period of decades in which democratic waves rolled through East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa… For many Middle East specialists, this remarkable record of regime stability in the face of numerous challenges demanded their attention and an explanation… As a result, academics directed their attention toward explaining the mechanisms that Arab states had developed to weather popular dissent… We in the academic community made assumptions that, as valid as they might have been in the past, turned out to be wrong in 2011… Academic specialists on Arab politics, such as myself, have quite a bit of rethinking to do… Explaining the stability of Arab authoritarians was an important analytic task, but it led some of us to underestimate the forces for change that were bubbling below, and at times above, the surface of Arab politics,‖ wrote political scientist and Gulf scholar F. Gregory Gause III.
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The emergence of militant soccer fans as a social movement that fits some but not all of the boxes of various strands of social movement theory is one example of the underestimation of forces for change that Gause alludes to. More fundamentally, those forces can only be understood and explained by the kind of innovative multi-disciplinary approach adopted in this chapter that involves historical analysis, 
